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MALPRACTICE
Criminal justice Act of 1964 e State Malpractice Suit
Against Appointed Counsel
Ferri v. Ackerman, 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979).
T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT in Ferri v. Ackerman' reversed
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court' and held that an attorney appointed by
a federal judge to represent an indigent defendant in a federal criminal trial
is not, as a matter of federal law, entitled to absolute immunity in a state
malpractice suit brought against him by his former client. In a unanimous
opinion, the Court decided that the function of appointed counsel is more
closely analogous to that of private retained counsel, who enjoy no im-
munity from malpractice prosecution than to that of judges and prosecutors
who have traditionally been accorded immunity at common law.'
Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964" and the Criminal Justice
Act Plan for the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, ' a federal district court appointed attorney Daniel Ackerman
to represent Francis Ferri, an indigent defendant, in a criminal trial." After
subsequent conviction, Ferri brought suit in a Pennsylvania state court
for malpractice in Ackerman's conduct of the federal criminal trial.' The
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the defendant was
immune from civil liability. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the order of the lower court, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania af-
firmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that attorney Ackerman was
immune from civil liability.'
To determine the existence and scope of immunity protecting a partici-
pant in a federal procedure, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court felt con-
strained to look to federal law.' If the federal legislature has been silent as
1 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979).
2483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978).
3 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randal v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
523 (1868).
' Criminal Justice Act of 1964, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
3 Adopted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (a) (1976).
s United States v. Ferri, 546 F.2d 419 (3rd Cir. 1976).
1 Petitioner alleges negligent acts on the part of the defense counsel in the management
of the criminal defense at both the pretrial and trial stages. More specifically, petitioner
amended his complaint to charge malpractice in respondent's failure to plead the three
year statute of limitations for Internal Revenue Code offenses pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
6531 (1976) as a defense. Because of this failure, petitioner alleges that he has been
subjected to an additional ten years in prison and is seeking monetary damages.
8 483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978).
9 Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Chandler v. O'Brien, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir.
1971); Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965).
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to absolute immunity, the Pennsylvania Court held that federal standards
would be judged by federal common law."°
Briefly outlining the history of the doctrine of common law immunity,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that immunity has been fully ex-
tended to state and federal judges1 and then to both state and federal prose-
cutors.12 Barr v. Mateo"3 extended immunity to federal employees and Butz
v. Economou" allowed immunity to grand jurors. In Brown v. Joseph5 and
John v. Hurt 6 state public defenders were held to be immune from civil lia-
bility. The rationale for the doctrine is the public interest in the proper ad-
ministration of justice (i.e. the necessity to free a judicial officer from ap-
prehension about his personal liability in order that he exercise his best
discretion in the public interest). The Pennsylvania Court held that this
view is embraced by the federal system today'7 and that the immunity is
absolute. Although immunity has been upheld as a bar to legal malpractice
actions in federal appellate courts, the few state courts to decide the issue
have denied immunity. 8
Only two federal cases have discussed immunity of federally appointed
criminal defense attorneys."9 Both have affirmed the doctrine. Additionally,
Butz has extended a qualified immunity to some federal executive of-
ficials under the rationale that "immunity is thus necessary to assure that
judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions with-
out harassment or intimidation."20
The criteria established by the United States Supreme Court in Butz
and Imbler v. Pachtman2 for determining the applicability of the im-
munity doctrine are: (1) a case by case inquiry into the historical
basis for immunity of the particular official at common law and, (2) the
interests behind it. Although the requirement of government-sponsored de-
'0 Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. at 597.
"Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randal v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wal.)
523 (1868).
2
2 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1926); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.B.
1001 (1896).
is 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
14438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Is 463 F.2d 1046 (3rd Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
16489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
17 O'Bryan v. Chandler, 496 F.2d 403 (10th Cir. 1974); Garfield v. Palmeiri, 297 F.2d
526 (2nd Cir. 1962); Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1960); Griffith
v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896).
28 Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. Supp. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (Super. Ct. 1975).
19 Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th
Cir. 1966).
20438 U.S. 478 (1978).
21 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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fense counsel for indigents accused of a crime is of relatively recent origin,2
absolute immunity has been afforded to these attorneys by every federal ap-
pellate court considering the issue.2 3 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has chosen to view the role of appointed counsel as more closely
analogous to that of private retained counsel who do not enjoy immunity
from prosecution.
The narrow issue presented to the Court in the present case was whether
federal law in any way pre-empts the freedom of a state to decide the
question of immunity in accordance with its own laws. The specific inquiry
was whether federal law requires a state to accept the defense of immunity.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in relying on Howard v. Lyons,2"
held that the validity of the immunity claim must be judged by federal stand-
ards. If the federal legislature has not specifically granted the immunity, fed-
eral common law would provide the standard. In so holding, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court 5 looked to the authority for federally appointed de-
fense counsel, the Criminal Justice Act.26 The Court stated, "the very
nature of a ruling of privilege requires reference to the law of the sovereign
creating it for a determination of its nature and scope.""7
Relying on Howard as a basis for applying federal standards, the Pen-
nsylvania Supreme Court appeared to consider federal appointed counsel
as "officers of the federal government acting in the course of their duties."28
The United States Supreme Court rejects this categorization and finds that
appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act do not become officers
of the federal government.
The precise issue of whether court appointed counsel in a federal
prosecution is deemed a federal official for purposes of granting immunity
in a state malpractice case has never been addressed by an appellate court.
However, several analogous situations offer guidance. Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 9 it has been held that appointed counsel is not an "em-
ployee" of the United States. 0 Similarly, the only circuits to squarely ad-
dress the issue have held that Criminal Justice Act appointees are private
22 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
23 Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973);
Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1973); Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828
(4th Cir. 1966).
24360 U.S. 593 (1959).
25 483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978).
26 Criminal Justice Act of 1964, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
27 394 A.2d at 555.
28 360 U.S. at 597.
29 The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
30 Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977).
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individuals and are not "under color of law" for remedies based on the United
States Constitution. 1 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,32
the Court held that federal question jurisdiction was available in bringing
suit for damages for injury to a constitutionally protected interest. The
Court did not, however, decide the question of whether the agents were
immune from liability by virtue of their official position. Appointed counsel,
also, are not considered to be "acting under color of state law" for a claim
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 3 They are deemed independent private
citizens, not controlled by the state in the carrying forth of their duties.
Some circuits have accorded this independent status to public defend-
ers as well. " The common theme of these decisions is that compensation
by the government does not result in government control of the appointed
counsel and that court appointed counsel is as much "private" as his re-
tained counterpart. Similarly, a state action does not accrue merely because
an attorney is an officer of the court.'5 He is not an employee or agent of the
state, but is more nearly an independent contractor. Though the Criminal
Justice Act recognized a need to compensate appointed counsel, it did not in-
tend to make them federal officials. In Howard the defendant was a United
States Naval Commander. His authority was derived from federal sources,
and the resolution of his privilege of immunity directly affected the function-
ing of the federal government. In Ferri, appointed counsel is not deemed to
be a federal official, nor is it sufficient that the tort arose during a federal
legal proceeding. 6 The Erie Doctrine3' dictates that except in matters gov-
erned by the United States Constitution or in other limited areas of strong
federal concern 8 the law to be applied is generally the law of the state.
Another line of analysis agrees that an analogy must be drawn due
to the shortage of cases regarding immunity for appointed counsel but views
the correct parallel as between the new position (court appointed counsel)
and the positions existing at common law.39 The pivotal question becomes
whether appointed counsel is more analogous to judges and prosecutors or
to retained counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Ferri finds it to
be the latter.
31 Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1979).
32403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
3 4 Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
35 Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972).
3 6The Court in Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978), states, "We are re-
quired to look to federal law in determining the immunity of a participant in a federal legal
proceeding."
3 7 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say.
Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943).
39 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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If Howard is held inapplicable as pertaining only to "officers of the
federal government", other federal interests must be found to support the
application of a federal rule rather than state law. The Supreme Court
looked to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act and United States
Supreme Court cases regarding the immunity of federal "officers" in the
performance of their duties.
In considering the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, the Court found no
specific grant of immunity. In Tenney v. Brankhove0 the Supreme Court
concluded that silence by Congress would imply its intent to retain the ex-
isting common law state of affairs. Indeed, Congress, being made up largely
of attorneys, was undoubtedly aware of malpractice liability but chose not
to specifically adopt immunity. Therefore, it was not the Congressional
intent to abrogate the common law malpractice action in this Act. In
fact, looking closely at Congressional intent in framing this act, the Court
is further convinced of Congress' strong desire to have appointed counsel
retain their autonomy and independence from the government as well
as their civil liability for tortious conduct.' It was the legislative intent that
assigned counsel be free from political influence and government control.
Sole loyalty was to be owed to the client. Appointed defense counsel must
have "exactly the same duties, and burdens, and responsibilities as the
highly paid, paid-in-advance criminal defense lawyer." 2 Legislative history
reveals a desire to compensate, but not to federalize appointed counsel. "3
It was for this reason that the House view of the Act prevailed over the
Senate view," and a public defender system was not included in the original
40341 U.S. 367 (1951).
41 110 CONG. REc. 18558 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Moore): The Senate Bill, in addition
to authorizing the appointment of private counsel, would have empowered the federal
government to establish federal public defender offices in any or all of the judicial dis-
tricts throughout the country. This would have had the effect of placing the administration
of justice totally in the hands of the federal government. An individual, accused of a
crime, would have been tried before a federal judge, prosecuted by a federal district
attorney, and defended by a federal public defender. Thus, the total right of a fair
trial and to the preservation of one's right to liberty would be solely dependent upon
men appointed by the federal government and compensated out of the Federal Treasury.
This condition could easily have led to the establishment of totalitarian justice with the
well-known unfairness and inequities found in totalitarian states. In addition, this condi-
tion could have severely undermined the duties and responsibilities of members of the
bar who I believe are under an obligation to defend individuals, even those without funds
and even (those) charged in an unpopular cause. The burdens of preserving a healthy
society have been gradually eroded in recent years through too great a dependence.
42 Burger, Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense - Their Roles under the Minimum
Standards, 8 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 6 (1969).
43 Private citizens are often the recipients of federal funds but are not immune from tort
liability. (e.g. physicians and hospitals under Medicaid 42 U.S.C. § 1396).
44 "The provision was deleted due to the doubts raised in the House about the propriety
of placing the defense of criminal suspects in the control of the Government since the
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Act. 5 In summary, the United States Supreme Court finds nothing in the
purpose, the language, or the history of the Act that dictates that any state
must accept the defense of immunity in a state malpractice action.
Looking to other United States Supreme Court cases that might support
immunity for Criminal Justice Act appointees, the Court recognizes that
even without a specific statutory grant of immunity, this privilege has been
extended to various federal officers." The immunity is characterized as in-
cidental to the office. Many have argued that an appointed, government-
funded defense attorney must also be accorded this privilege as an incident
of his office and necessary to the performance of his official duties. The
American Bar Association Standards Section 1.1 (a) advances the theory that
the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel are a tripartite entity
operating for the efficient administration of justice. 7 "Counsel for the ac-
cused is an essential component of the administration of criminal justice.""
Lower courts have concluded that this tripartite entity exists for the public
interest, and each part of the triangle must have equal immunity to function
effectively. Indeed, it is argued that identically the same policy consider-
ations for according immunity to the judge and prosecuting attorney exist
in favor of the defense counsel. The Court in Imbler stated, "attaining the sys-
tem's goal of accurate determination of guilt or innocence requires that both
the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the
trial and the presentation of evidence." 9 Though it is true that defense
counsel's "function" is different from that of judge or prosecutor, this is
not the test. Clearly the judge's function is different from the prosecuting
attorney's and yet both enjoy immunity as an incident of their federal
office.
In the Ferri decision, the Court draws an important distinction in the
meaning of the term "federal officer". Justice Stevens writes, "[I]n a sense
a lawyer who is appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a federal
judicial proceeding is also a federal officer."" The Court then goes on to
distinguish between the nature of counsel's responsibilities and those of
other officers of the court. The prosecutor and the judge are public servants
who are full scale public officials owing their loyalty to the public interest. As
45 The 1970 Amendments to the Criminal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 91-477, § 1, 84 Stat.
916, subsequently created a public defender system but opted for a "mixed system" of
private attorneys and public defenders. The public defenders were to supplement but not
replace private counsel.
46Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (Referring to U.S. Naval Captains); Spalding
v. Villas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Referring to the Postmaster General).
47 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION [(Approved Draft, 1971), § 1.1(a)].
48Id.
'9 424 U.S. at 426.
50 100 S. Ct. at 408.
[Vol. 13:4
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 4, Art. 10
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss4/10
RECENT CASES
such, society has a great interest in providing these officials with an atmos-
phere in which they can operate fearlessly and impartially without fear
of retaliation or harassment. The Court, however, refuses to include fed-
erally-funded, appointed counsel as part of an equilateral triangle. The Court
finds a "marked difference" in the nature of counsel's responsibilities. De-
fense counsel, whether appointed or retained, must be a zealous, partisan
advocate. His duty is to serve the individual interest of the defendant. It is
not a public duty. The Court refuses to view appointed counsel as a gov-
ernment employee, official, or advocate. Appointed defense counsel must
remain independent of government interests and, indeed, must zealously
oppose the government in litigation. Appointed defense counsel must as-
sume the posture of a private citizen in the practice of his profession. The
parallel is drawn not between prosecutor and defender, but between ap-
pointed counsel and private retained counsel. The Court feels that it is
through this approach that the vitality of the adversary system can best be
transmitted to indigent defendants. The Court refuses to extend the um-
brella of federal immunity less the administration of criminal justice be
placed totally in the hands of the federal government. What defendant
could approach trial with confidence knowing he was to be prosecuted,
judged, and defended by government officials?
In an issue that is heavily laden with policy questions and social con-
siderations, the Supreme Court in Ferri has adopted a conservative stance
and a restrained position. The Court has narrowed its inquiry to the pragmatic
confines of what present federal law now provides. Constitutional questions,
social policy, and balancing of interests are not determinative. Procedural
aspects such as choice of law and interpretation of federal common law
form the basis for the Court's decision. The most outstanding mandate of
Ferri is the strong position of the United States Supreme Court that ap-
pointed defense counselors are private and independent of any cloak of
governmental control. The Court appears to reject the view that the judge/
prosecutor/defense counsel are a trinity operating for the public good.
Rather, it holds firmly to the view that the role of an appointed defense
counsel is that of a private, non-official adversary to the government position,
who is loyal solely to the indigent client.
While by-passing strong arguments of public policy, the Supreme Court
is not oblivious to their existence or their merit. The door is clearly left
open for change through legislative action. The Court asserts that the legis-
lature can specifically accord immunity when it is convinced by empirical
data and social observation that this has become necessary.5 At this point,
51 "Without reaching any question concerning the power of Congress to create immunity,
we hold that federal law does not now provide immunity for a court appointed counsel in
a state malpractice suit brought by his former client." 100 S. Ct. at 410 (1979).
Spring, 1980]
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however, the rationale for this change appears to the Court to be somewhat
speculative, and the imperative of expanded immunity has not been proven.
In appraising the societal effects of immunity for court appointed
defense counsel, there is general agreement that the paramount question is
whether the policy will result in more effective legal representation of the
poor or whether it will encourage incompetence. Does the fear of malpractice
liability evoke a higher standard of care and professionalism, or does it
place constraints on appointed defense counsel which inhibit his best efforts
on behalf of his client? Some maintain that to the conscientious dedicated
attorney, immunity would make little difference. On the contrary, to the
uncaring and incompetent, immunity would provide a blanket of protection.
Judge Learned Hand has stated his opposite opinion in Gregiore v. Biddle,
that the threat of civil liability "would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.""2 The United States Supreme Court in Butz and Imbler has rejected
the idea that immunity causes a dereliction of duty. Indeed, the question
arises that if immunity leads to lessening standards of performance, should
it even be accorded to judges and prosecutors? In a brief of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association as amicus curiae in Ferri,3 the Associ-
ation asserts that absolute immunity should not be afforded to judges, prose-
cutors, or defense counsel whether retained or appointed. It is the Associ-
ation's contention that all of the above can be expected to exercise sound
discretion in spite of potential tort liability. Also, making judges and prose-
cutors liable to suit would be one check on the abuse of power which, in
practicality, cannot be reached by impeachment or election procedures.
The greatest single concern of the Court in recognizing the future
potential for legislative action in this area is ensuring that competent counsel
remain willing to serve indigent defendants notwithstanding lower remuner-
ation and civil liability. Attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice
Act face lower fees, often less than 25 per cent of similar private cases,
and in some cases their effort is not reimburseable at all. To this must be
added the costs of increased malpractice insurance. It is no secret that many
public defenders and appointed private defenders are saddled with case
loads far in excess of their private counterparts. Given these circumstances,
there is concern that the supply of competent counsel for this important
function of the criminal justice system would dry up. As detrimental as
this would be to the recruitment of full-time public defenders, its effect
on the acquisition of part-time defense attorneys would be staggering."
52 177 F.2d 579 at 581 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1949).
53 Brief of National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Ferri v. Ackerman, 100 S. Ct.
402 (1979).
54 Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977).
[Vol. 13:4
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Others contend that the supply of available defense attorneys is not likely
to dissipate as long as there is adequate compensation and malpractice in-
surance. The answer, then, is not a counter-productive policy of immunity,
but to provide higher salaries and better working conditions to those repre-
senting indigent defendants.
Some observers assert that the practical realities surrounding appointed
defense counsel differ markedly from those of retained counsel and that
these differences militate in favor of immunity for appointed but not re-
tained counsel.5" Defendants who hire their own counsel may select whom-
ever they chose and are free to substitute whenever they wish. The indigent
client cannot choose or substitute, and court appointed defense attorneys
can generally not decline or withdraw." The fact that the client has chosen
his own counsel reflects confidence in his choice. On the other hand, clients
often exhibit a general suspicion and mistrust of government appointed
attorneys. Frequently, these lawyers must represent a hostile, uncooperative
client after a retained atorney has withdrawn from the case. Since the at-
torney/client relationship is strained from the beginning, 7 the defendant
may be quick to retaliate against his lawyer when an adverse decision is
reached. On occasion a defendant is venting his anger at the whole judicial
system by bringing a malpractice suit against his lawyer. This problem is
compounded by the low education level of many indigent defendants who
do not understand the technicalities of a judicial proceeding and the emotion-
ally charged atmosphere of a criminal courtroom. Misunderstanding, dis-
trust, and defensiveness often erupt into charges of malpractice or attorney in-
competence. The financial status of the client can, itself, restrain the caliber
of defense that the appointed counsel is able to provide, leading again to in-
evitable bitterness in the client and retaliation against the attorney.
In view of the less than ideal circumstances surrounding the defense of
indigent clients, exposing a court appointed attorney to malpractice liability
can divert his defense of the client to self-protection. He may be forced to
consume more of the justice system's scarce resources than necessary to
insulate himself from personal liability. He might be persuaded, against
his better judgment, to accede to his client's wishes in structuring the
tactics of the defense. He may feel it necessary to call an inordinate
number of witnesses. U.S. General Inc. v. Schroeder aptly describes the
"chilling effect" on an attorney's zealous defense when he must also be
concerned with self-protection: "[I]f an attorney must work in constant
fear of civil liability, it is the rights of the public that will suffer. Any such
threat of liability visits an obvious chilling effect upon an attorney's en-
55 Id.
.1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 47, at 176, 234, 275-277.
51 Casper, Improving Defender-Client Relations, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 114 (1977).
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thusiasm to vigorously defend his client's position."5 An attorney concerned
over his own potential malpractice liability might be induced to present
arguments that are actually prejudicial to the defendant. Indeed, the irony
of malpractice litigation is that it compels an attorney to argue lack of
merit in a case he once advocated! 9 Certainly there would be a dampening
effect on an attorney's acknowledgement of his own mistake in the presen-
tation of the case. This admission is often critical in obtaining a new trial
or post-conviction relief for the client."° A further diversion of time, effort,
and resources occurs when government appointed attorneys must remain
vulnerable to defending themselves regarding cases decided years ago.
This time and effort is better spent in the defense of other indigent clients.
After considering whether there may be a differing need for immunity
between appointed and retained counsel, society must examine whether there
is also a distinction between appointed counsel and prosecutors and judges.
The Supreme Court has held that there is. The first distinction made is that
appointed counsel is not a full-time government employee. He runs his own
private practice, has an outside income, and makes his own business decis-
ions. Clearly he is liable for malpractice in cases arising under his private
practice. It is certainly conceivable, given that government compensation is
not competitive with private practice, that a busy attorney would be in-
duced to allocate more time and resources to the private sector of his prac-
tice. Offering a further inducement, immunity from civil liability regarding
only the indigent portion of his clientele, would be counter-productive to
effective assistance of counsel for the indigent clients.
The second and more important distinction is made as to the nature
of defense counsel's duties and those of judge and prosecutor. Defense coun-
sel serves his client in an undivided way. His responsibilities are not pri-
marily to the public, as are judge and prosecutor's. He functions as an
advocate of his client and an adversary of the government. Theoretically, it
is far less likely that this function will subject a defense counsel to a re-
taliatory suit by his client. Others argue strenuously that this is not so in
reality. The identical policy considerations which result in immunity for
judges and prosecutors (i.e. the concern that harrassment from unfounded
litigation will divert an attorney from his public duties and the exercise
of his best judgment) are equally applicable to appointed defense attorneys."5
Walker v. Kruse states, "The reasoning which provides immunity for various
58 400 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
59 In many jurisdictions in order to prevail in a malpractice action, plaintiff must prove
that, but for the attorney's negligence, the plaintiff would have been acquitted. It is, therefore,
not inconceivable that an attorney, anticipating the potential of a malpractice suit by an
uncooperative client, could attempt to cover this risk by actually seeking evidence of his
client's guilt.
6 0 Johnson v. United States, 328 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
01 424 U.S. at 422, 423.
[Vol. 13:4
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public officials . . . is also applicable to the performance by private citi-
zens of public services which play such a significant role in the adminis-
tration of justice."2
Even though the circustances in which appointed and retained counsel
serve have apparent dissimilarities, the United States Supreme Court finds
that these differences are not overriding. Likewise, even though much of the
same rationale for supporting immunity for judges and prosecutors applies
to appointed counsel, the Court finds the dissimilarities are greater.
In balancing the interests involved in the question of immunity, legis-
lative and judicial lawmakers must consider more than the interests of
the individuals involved. The government itself has an important interest
in a full and fair trial and a reliable determination of guilt or innocence.
It is arguable that this is the highest priority and that the judge, prosecutor,
and defense counsel must be immunized to uphold the government's in-
terest in the integrity of the judicial process. In this regard, the focal point
shifts from whether one is a federal "official" to whether one is functioning
in a judicial proceeding. Robichaud v. Ronan restates this criteria for im-
munity as whether the tortious acts were committed "in the performance of
an integral part of the judicial process."'" The United States Supreme Court
in Ferri does not accept this strong emphasis on vindicating the government's
interest by removing liability from all participants in a judicial proceeding.
Although the Court in Ferri did not discuss the issue, a basic question
arises as to the overall necessity for allowing civil damages as a remedy for
a criminal defendant. Proponents of immunity argue that the defendant would
not be left without other adequate relief for attorney malpractice. Reversal
on appeal" or federal habeas corpus" relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel"6 are available to him. Courts have been more willing to hear
claims of ineffective assistance where counsel was appointed than where
counsel was privately retained. On the contrary, there is speculation that
courts will be somewhat restrained in finding for an accused when they
are aware that their decision may result in an appointed counsel being
made to answer in damages. This, then, would be self-defeating to the
criminal defendant's cause as he may be denied post-conviction relief.
Opponents of the privilege of immunity argue strenuously that both
remedies are necessary. Post-conviction relief does nothing to financially
compensate the malpractice victim. It operates only as relief from the
62 484 F.2d at 804, 805.
63 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965).
64 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
63 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
66 U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
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criminal sentence, not as compensation for a tortious act. It also has little
deterrent effect, direct or indirect, on incompetent or negligent attorneys
as it imposes no financial sanction. In any case, a state is free to make avail-
able a civil remedy for the tort of legal malpractice. This should not be
confused with collateral relief in a criminal case as they are not mere
alternatives."'
Similar arguments can be made in favor of limiting a cause of action
for malpractice in lieu of judicial sanctions and professional discipline avail-
able against an incompetent attorney. This remedy could be more ob-
jectively applied as it would be imposed by those better informed of the
strains of the profession and the intricacies of presenting a criminal defense.
There would be less room for purely vindictive suits and a more fair evalu-
ation of the merits of the claim. Though these remedies are available and
are being increasingly invoked, their overall effectiveness has not been im-
pressive. Some argue that a defendant has no financial incentive to seek
such disciplinary measures. Others counter that many charges are, in fact,
filed with bar councils but are dismissed as meritless claims. In any case,
judicial and professional discipline do not provide financial relief to the
victim and appear to be supplemental rather than alternatives.
Certainly the question of immunity for court appointed counsel reveals
the tension existing between the scenario of the lawyer as an "alter ego"
of his client and the view of the lawyer as an "officer of the court."68 In
many cases the line between proper and improper conduct is difficult to
ascertain. Proponents of immunity for court appointed counsel argue that
the threat of exposure to personal liability will color an attorney's judgment
of ethical considerations in close cases and will thereby reduce the integrity
of the judicial system.
The United States Supreme Court in Ferri does not choose to deal with
federal constitutional issues in determining respondent's liability for mal-
practice though constitutional questions do arise. Justice Roberts, in dissent-
ing from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, raises the question of
equal protection and a double standard based on wealth. "Those who cannot
afford private counsel are denied a remedy for inadequate representation
which is apparently available to those who can afford privately retained
67 It is interesting in the present case to note that petitioner fied no petition for collateral
relief from the ten year additional sentence which he alleges is due to respondent's negli-
gence in handling the defense. This additional ten year sentence will not accrue until a
current twenty year sentence is served. If petitioner were to file for collateral relief from
the ten year sentence and prevail, he would eliminate any damage to himself whatever.
He would also have no grounds for a cause of action against respondent. If, however, he
is unsuccessful and the court finds respondent not negligent, this holding might form the
basis for a collateral estoppel defense in the malpractice action.
68Timberlake, The Lawyer as an Officer of the Court, 11 VA. L. REV. 263 (1924).
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counsel. Furthermore, the denial of such a remedy must be viewed as
establishing a lower standard of care for appointed counsel."'"
While it is true that there is no constitutional right to sue for mal-
practice, it is also true that if this right is granted, it cannot be arbitrarily
applied without violating the principle of equal protection. Griffin v. Illinois
states, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the the amount of money he has."" It is also arguable that
denying a criminal the right to sue his court appointed attorney denies
him fundamental rights inviting the "close scrutiny" of the courts. It
must then be demonstrated that a compelling state interest is at stake in
denying these rights.7 One such fundamental right is the effective assistance
of counsel. If, as Justice Roberts suggests, granting of immunity leads
to a lower standard of care for appointed counsel, this fundamental right
may be in jeopardy for indigent clients. On the contrary, it has been
asserted that allowing immunity does not inevitably lead to a lower
standard of care. 73 The remedy of a malpractice action is not constitutionally
mandated, and, furthermore, removing liability for court appointed de-
fense counsel could well be justified as rationally related to a legitimate
government objective. The argument that prohibiting a state malpractice
action to an indigent defendant effectively denies him the fundamental right
of access to the courts invites a similar response. The immunity doctrine
merely precludes one form of remedy, and there is no constitutional right
to any particular form of remedy. Notwithstanding the problem of potential
federal constitutional violations, the United States Supreme Court does
not appear to base its resolution of the Ferri case on constitutional grounds.
The issue of immunity in general, and more specifically, the issue
of immunity for court appointed legal counsel is pervasive with questions
of social and legal policy. The ramifications on the criminal justice system
are undeniable. Yet the Supreme Court in Ferri has adopted a restrained
position in sweeping with a narrow brush over these issues. The Court does
not deny the possibility that its decision will be legislatively overruled. On
the contrary, it seems to encourage a protracted look at the problem by the
Congress. The matter will, however, be left to the legislature to change.
In this analysis, it is the historic role of defense counsel as an independent,
partisan advocate of his client that is upheld by the Court. The concept of any
form of coalition, actual or perceived, with the government which robs
the indigent defendant of an unfettered defense is odious to the Court and
69 483 Pa. at 100, 394 A.2d at 559.
70351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
T'Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
72M.E. Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1940).
71 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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against public policy. It is fidelity to this traditional view that is upheld.
There are, however, overtones that the Court is cognizant of the possibility
of being sound in theory but unrealistic in practice. Should this become
apparent, the Court has left the door ajar for change.
SANDRA J. BRANDA
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